Kalshi Ho-Chunk IGRA Case Stayed for Seventh Circuit Appeal

On September 11, 2026 a federal judge in Wisconsin stayed the Ho-Chunk Nation's Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) case against Kalshi and Robinhood and certified his own May decision for an interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit, a court that has not yet been asked to take it. Judge William M. Conley wrote that the questions are "percolating up to federal courts of appeals around the country and likely to the Supreme Court" and that the case "will certainly be appealed all the way up to the Supreme Court" whatever he decides.

The case is Ho-Chunk Nation v. Kalshi Inc., KalshiEX LLC, Robinhood Markets, Inc. and Robinhood Derivatives LLC, No. 25-cv-698-wmc in the Western District of Wisconsin. It is not the tribal case we have been tracking in California, and it has never been reported here. We pulled the eight-page opinion and order off the federal docket and read it in full this morning, which is how we check everything we publish.

Why does a prediction-market case matter to a sweeps player?

Because the same question sits under both products: at what point does a cash-prize game stop being a promotion or a financial contract and become gambling that a state or a tribe can switch off. This order answers half of it in terms unusually plain for a court, holding that "Kalshi does offer sports betting", and then declines to do anything about it. That combination is the story.

Nothing in it changes what any operator does today. The Ho-Chunk Nation asked for a preliminary injunction in this case and did not get one, and this week's order does not grant one either. Kalshi and Robinhood have not been found liable for anything. The practical effect of September 11 is that the one tribal case that had got furthest has now stopped moving, and will not move again until an appeal court that has not yet been asked decides whether to take it.

What did the Wisconsin court actually decide in May?

The order recites its own history, and the split in it is the reason for the appeal.

The Ho-Chunk Nation, described in the order as "a federally-recognized Indian tribe", brought three claims: that sports event contracts "amount to unlawful gaming in violation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act", that Kalshi's advertising for "legal" sports betting breaches the Lanham Act, and that all four defendants are racketeering under RICO.

The May 11, 2026 opinion split those three ways. The court granted the motion to dismiss "as to plaintiff's claims under the Lanham Act and RICO, but denied as to the IGRA claims". On the injunction it went half the tribe's way: "although plaintiff had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its IGRA claim, it had not shown irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief".

On the order's own account, only two courts have reached the IGRA question at all and the other one went Kalshi's way, so a likelihood-of-success finding is the furthest any tribe has got against Kalshi under IGRA. It is also the finding now offered up on appeal.

What two questions go to the Seventh Circuit?

Kalshi and Robinhood proposed their own wording. The judge rejected it, saying their phrasing did "not accurately reflect the court's reasoning and conclusions", and wrote the questions himself, with his own answers attached:

(1) Can the Nation bring a claim under IGRA to enjoin class III gaming, unauthorized by the tribe but offered on tribal land by an entity that is not party to the Tribal-State compact? (This court answered "yes.")

(2) Does the CEA or UIGEA preempt the Nation's authority under IGRA to regulate class III gaming activity that is offered on tribal lands in the form of sports events contracts on a derivative exchange? (This court answered "no.")

Both are pure questions of law, and the court notes the plaintiff conceded as much. If the Seventh Circuit disagrees on either one, the order says, "plaintiff's claims against defendants must be dismissed".

Why do two federal courts disagree about IGRA and Kalshi?

They do, and the order names the conflict directly. One half of it is a case we already cover.

Judge Conley writes that "the only two courts to have considered the specific question regarding IGRA and online sports events contracts have reached differing conclusions", and cites Blue Lake as the other one. That is the San Francisco case where one tribe dropped out and a hearing is set for September 24.

The wider preemption fight is split too, and the order lists it: the Ninth Circuit held in KalshiEX, LLC v. Assad on August 28, 2026 that "the CEA likely does not preempt Nevada's gaming regulations as applied to Kalshi's sports event contracts", and warned that accepting Kalshi's delegation argument "would create a major-questions problem". A judge in the Eastern District of Wisconsin held on July 29 that the CFTC "has not shown that it is likely to prevail on its argument that the CEA's definition of 'swaps' covers the event contracts offered by entities such as Kalshi". Two days before that, a Minnesota judge went the other way and granted Kalshi a preliminary injunction on CEA preemption. We covered the Ninth Circuit's Nevada decision when it landed, along with the Washington ruling that ordered Kalshi to geofence and the Tenth Circuit's refusal to pause Utah's ban.

Did the judge accept that these are not bets?

Not on this record, and the language is unusually plain for a court order.

The tribe tried to revive its false-advertising claim by arguing that calling the product "sports betting" is itself misleading, since Kalshi says it sells event contracts on a derivatives exchange. The court refused, but not on Kalshi's terms. It wrote that "as this court recognized throughout its earlier opinion, Kalshi does offer sports betting", quoted its own May order for the proposition that "the activity at issue here is sports betting", and cited the Ninth Circuit's line that "Kalshi's attempts to distinguish its sports event contracts from sportsbooks betting are unpersuasive".

The reason the amendment failed is narrower. Under the false-advertising cases the court applied, a statement about what the law permits is an opinion rather than a fact unless there is a "clear and unambiguous ruling from a court or agency of competent jurisdiction", and the judge held there is not one yet. The motion to amend was denied "as futile".

Does the Seventh Circuit have to take the appeal?

No. A section 1292(b) certification does not put the appeal in that court by itself, and that conditional is the part which tends to drop out of coverage of a certification order. The defendants have to ask the Seventh Circuit for permission, and it is free to refuse.

Paragraph 3 of the order makes the stay itself conditional on their asking. The court "will STAY all proceedings pending resolution of the legal questions certified for interlocutory appeal provided defendants seek leave to appeal from the Seventh Circuit expeditiously".

The statute sets a short window: 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b) lets a court of appeals permit the appeal "if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order". The order was entered on September 11. Three things have to happen, in this order, before the Seventh Circuit decides anything:

1. Kalshi and Robinhood apply to the Seventh Circuit for leave to appeal, within ten days of September 11, which on our count puts the application due around September 21.
2. The Seventh Circuit decides whether to accept the two certified questions. It is free to refuse them.
3. If it refuses, the condition attached to the stay is not met and the district case can resume in Wisconsin. If it accepts, the Wisconsin case stays frozen until the appeal is resolved.

The judge's own word for the timing is "expeditiously" and he sets no date of his own. A petition is filed in the court of appeals rather than in Wisconsin, so the district docket we read is not where it would appear.

For anyone weighing where to play, none of this touches a sweepstakes account. Our ranked list of sweepstakes casinos covers the brands still operating, our guide to whether sweepstakes casinos are legal covers the separate position for the dual-currency model, and the state-by-state legality matrix shows where each one stands today. Prediction markets sit under a different body of law entirely, which is exactly what these two questions are about. Robinhood, a defendant here, is also facing a state deadline in Michigan over the same product, and Wisconsin is now the state with two separate federal fronts running on it.

Sources & documents

• Opinion and Order, Ho-Chunk Nation v. Kalshi Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00698 (W.D. Wis.), Doc. 114, filed September 11, 2026 - eight pages, signed by District Judge William M. Conley. Every quotation above is from this document
• CourtListener docket, Ho-Chunk Nation v. Kalshi Inc. - 114 entries, read September 12, 2026
• CourtListener entry search for the Kalshi captions since September 9, 2026 - how we found the order
• 28 U.S.C. section 1292, govinfo - subsection (b), the ten-day window to apply to the court of appeals

21+. Court filings and orders describe legal argument, not settled law. Nothing above is legal advice. If gambling is a problem, call or text 1-800-GAMBLER. Responsible gaming resources.